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California's New Scheme For The
Commitment Of Individuals Found
Incompetent To Stand Trial
MARJORY WINSTON PARKER*
Concepts of basic fairness and the belief that a mentally incompetent
criminal defendant is unable to adequately defend himself have led to
the view that such a defendant should not be made to stand trial, even
with the assistance of counsel.' What action if any, then, may a state take
regarding an individual charged with a criminal act who is incompetent
to stand trial? Until recently the answer in California was simple. The
defendant was committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility
until he attained the capacity to stand trial,2 that is, until he was able to
understand the nature of the proceedings taken against him and to assist
counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.3 If he never
* B.A., 1950, University of Washington; LL.B., 1965, Georgetown University.
Deputy Attorney General, State of California. The author's opinions or conclusions ex-
pressed herein are her own and do not in any way represent the views of the State of
California, its departments, agencies, or officers. California Assemblyman Frank Mur-
phy, author of Assembly Bill 1529, requested the assistance of the Attorney General in
drafting the legislation. Over an eighteen month period, the author of this article
worked closely with the Assemblyman and his staff. Equally involved and making ma-
jor contributions were Laurance S. Smith, Los Angeles County Deputy Public Defender,
and Karen Pedersen, Consultant to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The author
of this article also appeared and testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in sup-
port of Assembly Bill 1529.
1. See, e.g., In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 333, 61 P. 1120, 1121 (1900); People
v. Maynard, 347 Ill. 422, 425, 179 N.E. 833, 835 (1932). Cf., e.g., People v. Lawson,
178 Cal. 722, 725, 174 P. 885, 887 (1918).
2. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 599, at 1270.
3. E.g., People v. Aparicio, 38 Cal. 2d 565, 567, 241 P.2d 221, 223 (1952). -U
should be noted that the Penal Code was amended by Chapter 1511, statutes of 1975,
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attained the requisite competency, his commitment operated as a life
sentence. It made no difference whether he was charged with murder or
petty theft.4 Nor was it important that there was no judicial determina-
tion that there existed probable cause to believe that the accused had-in
fact committed the crime charged; the mere filing of a criminal com-
plaint was sufficient. 5 Thus the net effect of a scheme designed to protect
a defendant's sixth amendment rights was, in some cases, more severely
oppressive than a deprivation of those rights.6
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court delineated principles of
equal protection and due process which, when applied by the California
Supreme Court, put an end to the then existing scheme for the commit-
ment of incompetent criminal defendants.7 The California Legislature
responded with a new and more equitable commitment scheme which
became effective in September 1974.8 California's new law is a complex
attempt to integrate and resolve the conflicting concerns of protecting
society from dangerous individuals who are not subject to criminal pros-
ecution, preserving a libertarian policy regarding the indefinite commit-
ment of mentally incompetent individuals who have not been charged
with criminal conduct, and safeguarding the freedom of incompetent
criminal defendants who present no threat to the public.
This article will discuss the new statutory scheme fot the involuntary
commitment of mentally incompetent criminal defendants in California
and the old law which it has replaced. It will discuss the United States
Supreme Court and California cases which motivated the change and
the difficulty such cases presented to the California Legislature. Finally,
to substitute the term "mental incompetence" for the former term "insanity" without
changing the meaning. This change was to eliminate confusion with the insanity de-
fense available under Penal Code Section 1026, and with the diminished capacity defense
at the guilt phase. See, e. g., People v. Miller, 7 Cal. 3d 562, 498 P.2d 1089, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1972); People v. Brock, 57 Cal. 2d 644, 371 P.2d 296, 21 Cal. Rptr. 560
(1962).
4. Section 1367 of the Penal Code provides that no mentally incompetent person
may be tried for a "public offense."
5. The court could at that time commit a defendant to a treatment facility prior
to a grand jury or preliminary hearing establishing probable cause. See CAL. PEN. COD
§1368, as amended, CAL. STATs. 1937, c. 133, at 373.
6. Criticisms of the traditional procedures for handling mentally incompetent
criminal defendants have been adequately covered elsewhere and will not be dealt with
here. For an excellent treatment of this area see Janis, Incompetency Commitment: The
Need For Procedural Safeguards and a Proposed Statutory Scheme, 23 CATH. U.L. Rv.
720 (1974); also see Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 -A1v. L. REv. 1190 (1974). It should be noted that this literature discusses com-
mitment procedures with the premise that one may be committed on the grounds of
"dangerousness." California does not presently provide for civil commitment on these
grounds. See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
7. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); In re Davis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d
1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1973).
8. CAL. STATs. 1974, c. 1511.
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it will address the question of whether the new California law complies
with the constitutional mandates of those cases.
CALIFORNiA'S LAW FOR THE COMMITMENT OF MENTALLY
INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUALS
A. California's Special Problem
Until September 1974, the California Penal Code permitted a crimi-
nal defendant who had been found incompetent to stand trial to be com-
mitted indefinitely to state mental hospitals.' The commitment proce-
dures provided that if, at any time prior to judgment, doubts arose
regarding the competency of the defendant to stand trial, the court was
required to suspend the prosecution and order a hearing on the issue of
competency either by the court, or if demanded, by jury.10 Upon a deter-
mination that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial, that is, that
he was unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
or to assist counsel in his defense, he was committed to a state hospital
and confined until he regained his mental competence.' If the defend-
ant regained mental competence he was returned to the court for trial
or dismissal of the criminal charges pending against him. 12
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court in the case of Jackson v.
Indiana"3 held that an Indiana commitment scheme similar to that of
California denied such defendants equal protection of the laws and vio-
lated due process. In Jackson, the Court held that the Indiana statute de-
prived a defendant of equal protection because it subjected him to com-
mitment standards more lenient and release standards more stringent
than the standards generally applicable to persons committed under In-
diana's civil commitment laws.' 4 The effect of the Indiana scheme, said
the Court, was to condemn persons against whom criminal charges were
made, but not yet proved, to permanent institutionalization without the
showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afford-
ed by ordinary civil commitment procedures.'5 The Court also held that
the Indiana scheme violated due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment,' 6 and ruled that a defendant committed under the Indiana scheme
could not be held more than a reasonable period of time necessary to
determine whether there was a substantial probability that he would at-
9. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 599, at 1270.
10. CAL. PEN. CODE §1368, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1937, c. 133, at 373.
11. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 599, at 1270.
12. CAL. PEN. CODE §1372, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 599, at 1270.
13. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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tain competency in the foreseeable future.' 7 If his return to competency
in the near future was not foreseeable, the Court stated, then the defend-
ant must either be released or committed pursuant to civil proceedings
applicable to those not charged with crimes.18
One year later, in In re Davis,'9 the California Supreme Court fol-
lowed Jackson and held that when there is no reasonable likelihood that
a criminal defendant will regain competency to stand trial in the foresee-
able future, he must either be released or subjected to commitment pro-
ceedings initiated pursuant to California civil commitment laws as em-
bodied in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (hereinafter referred to as the
LPS Act). 20
The civil commitment scheme contained in the LPS Act provides for
72-hour,2 ' 14-day,22 and 90-day23 civil commitments and a one-year
renewable conservatorship. 24 Under the LPS Act a person who as a re-
sult of mental disorder is a danger to himself or to others, or gravely
disabled, may be taken into custody and placed in a county designated
facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation, with or without a court
order.25 Under certain circumstances, he may be detained for an addi-
tional 14-day period of intensive treatment.28 Additionally, an individu-
al may be confined for a maximum of 90 days if he has threatened, at-
tempted, or inflicted physical harm on another after being taken into
custody, or if he has attempted or inflicted physical harm on another
which resulted in his being taken into custody, provided that he presents
an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others as a result of
mental disorder.
At the time of the Jackson and Davis cases, long-term involuntary
commitment under the LPS Act was imposed only upon individuals cat-
egorized as "gravely disabled," that is, "unable to feed, clothe and
17. Id. at 738.
18. Id.
19. 8 Cal. 3d 798, 50 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1973).
20. See id. at 807, 505 P.2d at 1025, 106 Cal. Rptr.at 185. The Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act (Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5000 et seq.) extensively revised Cali-
fornia's mental health law. One of its stated purposes was "[t]o end the inappropriate,
indefinite, and involuntary [civil] commitment of mentally disordered persons ... .and
to eliminate legal disabilities. . . ." CAL. WErLF. & INST. CODE § 5001.
21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5151, 5171, 5213, 5230.
22. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE §§5254, 5260.
23. CAL. VELF. & INST. CODE §5300.
24. CAL. WELF. & INT. CODE §5361.
25. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5150 (without a court order), 5200, 5213 (with
a court order).
26. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§5254, 5260. The grounds for certifying an indi-
vidual for 14 days of involuntary intensive treatment are that the individual, as a result
of a mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism, is a danger to himself or oth-
ers or is gravely disabled. CAL. WELF. & INT. CODE §5250.
27. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5300.
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house themselves. '2 8 Such individuals could be confined for one-year
renewable periods until the disability lapsed or was cured. 20 However,
the LPS Act contained no specific provision for the commitment of
criminal defendants who were found incompetent to stand trial. While
such defendants may well have fit into the category of persons who are a
danger to themselves or others so that short term commitments under the
LPS Act were possible, they would not necessarily fit into the category of
"gravely disabled" persons necessary for long-term commitment. Thus,
if the LPS Act were used to commit incompetent criminal defendants,
the 90-day period would typically constitute the maximum period of
commitment."
In contrast to the California scheme for civil commitment of the
mentally disordered, most states provide for the indefinite commitment
of persons who are potentially dangerous to themselves or others even
though they have not been charged with criminal offenses."1 In those
states a dangerous criminal defendant may be indefinitely committed, as
may any other person, on the ground of dangerousness.3 2 California has
rejected the preventative approach to civil mental incompetents. In Cali-
fornia, after the LPS Act, an individual is not civilly committed for an
indefinite period unless he is "gravely disabled," this is, unless he is un-
able to feed, clothe, or house himself.3 3 Therefore, the Jackson-Davis
mandate posed a special problem in California. Specifically, exact com-
pliance with the holdings in Jackson and Davis without any modifica-
tion of the California criminal commitment procedures would have re-
quired handling a mentally incompetent criminal defendant solely
under the civil commitment procedures.3 4 In many cases, a mentally
incompetent defendant would have been immune from more than a
short-term restraint on his liberty. A defendant charged with an atro-
cious crime would be close to complete freedom if he could initially con-
vince a jury that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial, and then at
his civil commitment hearing, establish that he was capable of caring for
28. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5008, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1593, at
3335.
29. See CAL. WELF. & INT. CODE §§5350, 5361.
30. Although unable to participate in a criminal proceeding, the defendant may in-
deed be capable of maintaining a minimal physical existence in his accustomed environ-
ment, or he may have friends or relatives to care for him. Thus, the same disability
which makes the defendant incapable of participating in a trial will not necessarily pre-
vent his functioning in other areas, particularly that of caring for himself. However,
evidence that the defendant has committed a dangerous crime more strongly suggests
that he may in fact be dangerous in the future. See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial,
81 H.Anv. L. REv. 454, 466 (1967).
31. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HRv. L. Rav. 1190, 1203-07 (1974).
32. See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HAv. L. REV. 454, 463 (1967).
33. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
34. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
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himself, and not, therefore, gravely disabled as required for long-term
civil commitment. 5
In response to this problem, the California Legislature passed Assem-
bly Bill 1529, authored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy, which was
enacted into law during the 1973-74 legislative session.3 6 The bill was
expressly declared to be a legislative response to the Davis holding3" and
was designed to bring California's criminal commitment procedure into
conformity with the guidelines laid out in Jackson and Davis.
B. A New Criminal Commitment Scheme
Assembly Bill 1529, which became effective as an urgency measure
on September 27, 1974, amended both the California Penal Code 8 and
the LPS Act.39 As a result of these amendments, criminal defendants
found incompetent to stand trial are now subject to an initial commit-
ment for a definitely limited period not to exceed three years.4" Thereaf-
ter, any further commitment may occur only if the defendant falls within
the new standards set forth in the LPS Act.
1. Precommitment Procedures
Under the new law, a criminal defendant who is mentally incompe-
tent, that is, who is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and to rationally assist counsel in the conduct of a defense as
a result of a mental disorder, may not be tried or sentenced while under
this disability.41 When a doubt arises as to the defendants mental compe-
tence, the court must state that doubt on the record and, if necessary,
recess the proceedings to permit defense counsel to form an opinion as to
his client's competency to stand trial.42 If defense counsel shares the
court's doubt regarding the defendant's competence, a special hearing
shall be held in the superior court to determine the question of compe-
tence.43 Even if counsel believes that the defendant is competent, the
35. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
36. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1511. Assemblyman Murphy was especially concerned
with the problem since his district included Santa Cruz County where three mass mur-
derers, Edmund E. Kemper m, Herbert Mullin, and John L. Frazier, among them had
perpetrated 23 killings in less than a three year period, People v. Kemper, No. 50628
(Super. Ct., Santa Cruz County, May 17, 1973); People v. Mullin, No. 50219 (Super.
Ct., Santa Cruz County, Mar. 14, 1973); and People v. Frazier, No. 45252 (Super. Ct.,
Santa Cruz County, Oct. 28, 1970).
37. A.B. 1529, CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1511.
38. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
39. See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
40. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
41. CAL. PEN. CODE §1367.
42. CAL. PEN. CoDE §1368(a).
43. CAL. PEN. CODE §1368(b).
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court may nevertheless order such a hearing on its own motion." When
the charge against the defendant is a felony, the competency hearing
may not be held until after filing of the indictment or information."
In the case of a felony, a demurrer or a motion to dismiss pursuant to
California Penal Code Sections 995 (insufficiency of indictment or in-
formation) or 1538.5 (motion to return property or suppress evidence)
may be made at any time, even while the proceedings to determine the
defendant's competence are pending.4 Where the charge is a misde-
meanor, the defense may demur or move to dismiss on the ground that
there is not probable cause to believe that a public offense has been com-
mitted and that the defendant is guilty thereof, or make a motion under
Penal Code Section 1538.5.47 Such motions or demurrers, if originated
in the municipal or justice court, must be made in the court having juris-
diction over the misdemeanor complaint before a competency hear-
ing may be held in the superior court.48 In ruling on a motion to dismiss a
misdemeanor complaint on a "no probable guilt" ground, the court has
wide discretion regarding the matters it may or may not consider.49
If the information, indictment, or misdemeanor complaint survives
the defendant's challenges as to its validity, a hearing is then held on the
question of mental competency to stand trial."0 The defendant is entitled
to have the issue of his competency tried by the court or a jury."1 The
court must first appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist and other
appropriate experts to examine the defendant. If the defendant is not
seeking a finding of incompetence, then two psychiatrists, licensed psy-
chologists, or a combination thereof shall be appointed; one may be
named by the defendant and one by the prosecution. 2 The defendant is
presumed to be competent;5" thus the party contending that the defend-
ant is mentally incompetent shall first introduce evidence to that effect. 4
Each party then may introduce rebuttal evidence and deliver final argu-
ments. 5 The trial will proceed unless the defendant is found mentally
44. Id.
45. CAL. PEN. CODE §1368.1(a).
46. Id.
47. CAL. PEN. CODE §1368(b). It should be apparent that the 1974 amendment
does not create a "misdemeanor preliminary hearing." The statute does not amend Pe-
nal Code Section 995 to provide for misdemeanor preliminary hearings; it deals only
with criminal defendants who are, or may be, mentally incompetent to stand trial.
48. CAL. PEN. CDE §1368.1(d).
49. See CAL. PEN. CoDE §1368.1(c). Affidavits or even a complaint signed and
sworn to by a percipient witness may be adequate.
50. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§1368.1, 1369.
51. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1369.
52. CAL. PEN. CODE §1369(a).
53. CAL. PEN. CODE §1369(f).
54. See CAL. PEN. CoDE §1369(b).
55. See CAL. PEN. CoDE §§1369(d)-(e).
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incompetent 6 by a preponderance of the evidence,57 and the jury's ver-
dict on the question of competence must be unanimous. 8 If the defend-
ant is determined to be incompetent to stand trial, the criminal proceed-
ings are suspended and the defendant is ordered to be placed in a
treatment facility.59
2. Penal Code Commitment
Within 90 days of a commitment made pursuant to Penal Code Sec-
tion 1370, the superintendent of the treatment facility must send the
committing court a written report concerning the defendant's progress
toward restoration of his mental competence."0 If the report indicates a
substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain his mental compe-
tency in the foreseeable future, he will remain in the treatment facility."'
Thereafter, reports must be submitted to the committing court at six-
month intervals.
62
If at any time during a commitment pursuant to Penal Code Section
1370 the superintendent certifies that a defendant has regained his com-
petence, the court must order the defendant returned for trial.68 On the
other hand, if at any time during the Penal Code commitment the super-
intendent reports that there is no substantial likelihood that the defend-
ant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable future, the com-
itting court must order the defendant returned to court. The committing
court must then either release the defendant or commit him civilly pur-
suant to the amended provisions of the LPS Act.6 If at any time during
the Penal Code commitment the pending criminal charge is dismissed, 5
56. See CAL. PEN. CoDE §1370.
57. CAL. PEN. CODE §1369(f).
58. Id.
59. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1370(a).
60. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370(b).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§1370(a), 1372(c).
64. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§1370(b)-(c).
65. Nothing in the 1974 amendment operates to vitiate the provisions of Penal
Code Section 1385, which permits dismissals of criminal actions, and pursuant to Penal
Code Section 1370(d), such dismissals remain available notwithstanding the commit-
ment of a defendant as incompetent to stand trial. On the other hand, neither a Penal
Code commitment pursuant to section 1370 nor a subsequent civil conservatorship as"gravly disabled," has been made the basis, per se, for dismissal of the underlying crim-
inal charge. There may be circumstances under the new procedures, as there were under
the old procedures, when the prosecuting attorney or the court will wish to dismiss the
action in the furtherance of justice. One such circumstance in which the prosecuting at-
torney might wish to have the criminal charges dismissed would involve a defendant who
(1) has spent the maximum period permissible under a Penal Code commitment, (2)
is still incompetent to stand trial, and (3) is charged with a nonviolent felony or mis-
demeanor and thus is not "gravely disabled" pursuant to section 5008(h) (2) of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code. The prosecuting attorney in such a case may be amenable
to the dismissal of the criminal charge and the placing of the defendant under a civil
conservatorship under section 5008.1(h) of the Welfare and Institutions Code on the
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the defendant must be released from any commitment order made but
without prejudice to the initiation of appropriate civil commitment pro-
ceedings under the LPS Act.66
If a defendant remains committed pursuant to Penal Code Section
1370 for 18 months, 67 he must be returned to the committing court for a
second competency hearing. At this hearing, the court must reach one of
three conclusions: (1) that the defendant has become competent to
stand trial; (2) that the defendant is not yet competent but is likely
to regain competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future; or (3)
that the defendant is not likely to recover competence but is subject
to civil commitment under the amended LPS Act.68
If the court determines that there is a substantial likelihood that the
defendant will regain mental competence in the foreseeable future, he
will be returned to the treatment facility, and again the superintendent
will submit periodic reports regarding the defendant's progress. The
maximum period of time during which the defendant may be so con-
fined, including the original 18-month period, is limited to three years or
the maximum term of incarceration for the most serious offense with
which he is charged, whichever is shorter. 69 At the end of that period, if
the defendant is still not competent to stand trial, he is again returned to
the committing court, which shall order the defendant committed civilly
pursuant to the amended LPS Act or released if he is not eligible for a
civil conservatorship.70
In summary, a criminal defendant who is adjudged to be mentally
incompetent to stand trial may leave his Penal Code commitment and
become subject to the provisions of the LPS Act either when the initial
commitment period expires, or during the initial commitment period,
when the court or the superintendent of the treatment facility deter-
mines that the defendant is unlikely to regain competency in the fore-
seeable future.
3. Civil Code Commitment
Under the LPS Act, a "gravely disabled" individual is eligible for a
one-year conservatorship which may be renewed yearly on a showing
ground that he is unable to feed, clothe, and house himself assuming, of course, that
such is the case.
66. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370(e).
67. Eighteen months is the optimal time for reconsideration of a defendant's com-
petence. Records of the Department of Health indicate that of the defendants commit-
ted under Penal Code Section 1370 who are returned for trial, the majority are returned
within two years. Letter from Stanley S. Chun, Crime Studies Analyst, Dep't of Justice,
to the author, Mar. 7, 1975, on file at the Pacific Law lournal.
68. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370(b)(2).
69. CAL. PEN. CODE. §1370(c)(1).
70. While the statute contains no express instruction that the defendant will be or-
dered released, it is apparent that such must be the result because there is no authority
allowing further conlinement or prosecution of the criminal offense.
492
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that the individual remains "gravely disabled."7' The 1974 amendment
to the LPS Act72 redefined "gravely disabled" to include two classes of
persons. The first class consists of the same persons who were subject to
long-term commitment under the pre-amended version of the LPS Act,
namely, those persons unable to feed, clothe, or house themselves. 73 The
second class includes the individual (1) who has been found mentally
incompetent to stand trial under Penal Code Section 1370; (2) who is
charged with having committed a felony involving death, great bodily
harm, or a serious threat to the physical well-being of another person;
(3) against whom there is pending an indictment or information; and
(4) who, as a result of mental disorder, is unable to understand the na-
ture and purpose of the proceedings taken against him and to assist
counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner.74
When a criminal defendant has been found to be gravely disabled, the
court then orders the conservatorship investigator of the county to initi-
ate conservatorship proceedings. 7 The defendant is thereafter treated
in the same manner as any other civilly committed individual, except
that he remains subject to trial on the underlying violent felony.76
It should be noted that upon termination of the Penal Code commit-
ment, defendants charged with misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies
are subject to only those provisions of the LPS Act which bear no rela-
tion to the pendency of criminal charges. Thus long-term commitment
of criminal defendants will be imposed only upon those defendants who
are charged with violent felonies or who are unable to feed, clothe, or
house themselves.77
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE
A. Initial Penal Code Commitment
The primary justification for criminal incompetency commitments is
the state's interest in bringing to trial an individual who has been accused
of a criminal offense. 78 In furtherance of this interest, the state may place
an individual under mental treatment to facilitate his recovery so that he
may be tried with a minimum delay.79 When involuntary commitment is
71. See CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE §§5360, 5361.
72. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1511.
73. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5008(h)(1). See text accompanying note 28 su-
pra. 74. CAL. WEL-. & INsT. CODE §5008(h) (2).
75. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370(c)(2).
76. See CAL. WELT. & INST. CODE §5369.
77. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
78. Cf. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
79. See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 462 (1967).
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founded on this rationale, however, there must be a substantial likeli-
hood that the defendant's incapacity is curable and that the type of treat-
ment offered at the institution of commitment will promote his recovery.
If the defendant's commitment is not justified by progress toward re-
gaining competence, the state has no legitimate interest in his continued
commitment on this ground. The commitment of such an individual
would no longer further the state's legitimate interest in bringing him to
trial.8° California's new Penal Code commitment scheme has taken into
account these considerations. Thus, a defendant found incompetent to
stand trial is no longer susceptible to indefinite commitment merely be-
cause of his incompetence to stand trial on the charges pending against
him.81 Unlike the Indiana commitment procedures condemned by the
Court in Jackson, -82 California's initial commitment scheme makes the
"likelihood of recovery" a chief factor in such an individual's continued
confinement.83 The California scheme provides for a continuing review
of a defendant's mental condition in order to insure that he is promptly
removed from criminal commitment if he attains competence, or if he is
not likely to respond to such care and treatment. Thus, California's pro-
cedure insures that an incompetent defendant's initial commitment is
justified by progress toward the goal of recovery.
The California commitment scheme is designed to satisfy the limita-
tions in Jackson regarding the length of a commitment. Although the
Court in Jackson expressly refused to set specific limits on duration, it
did limit the commitment to a period reasonably necessary to determine
the likelihood that the defendant will regain competency. 84 The Califor-
nia scheme places definite limitations on the initial period of confine-
ment, allowing a maximum period of three years or the maximum length
of incarceration for the offense charged, whichever is shorter.85 This
three-year or maximum-sentence limitation must be considered a legis-
lative judgment that upon the expiration of the established period the
state interest in bringing the defendant to trial becomes outweighed by
considerations of individual freedom. The greater the maximum sen-
tence for the crime charged, the greater is the state's interest in bringing
the defendant to trial and thus the greater the length of confinement
before the state interest is outweighed by considerations of individual
freedom.
80. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
81. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
82. 406 U.S. at 730.
83. See CAL. PEN. CoDE §1370(b).
84. 406 U.S. at 738.
85. CAL. PEN. CODE §1370(c)(1).
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This approach for determining the reasonable period of initial com-
mitment under the California scheme was suggested by the California
Supreme Court in Davis when it set forth guidelines that a trial court
should consider in exercising its discretion as to whether continued com-
mitment pending trial is justified. The court stated:
To guide its discretion, the trial court should consider, among
other things the nature of the offense charged, the likely penalty
or range of punishment for the offense, and the length of time the
person has already been confined.86
Other courts have used the maximum-sentence limitation. In Waite v.
Jacobs87 a criminal defendant had been committed to a mental hospital
after he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. He had been confined
for over nine of the ten years for which he might have been sentenced
criminally. He filed a petition for habeas corpus, and at the hearing the
key issue was whether the government should bear the burden of prov-
ing that continued confinement beyond the maximum period of crimi-
nal incarceration was justified.88 The court held that after the expiration
of the period for which an acquittee might have been incarcerated had he
been convicted, it might be irrational, within the meaning of the equal
protection doctrine, to distinguish between an acquittee (one acquitted
on the basis of insanity at the time of the offense) and a civil commit-
ee.89 Acquittees who had already been confined for that period, there-
fore, might be entitled to treatment no different from that afforded civil
commitees. The court reasoned that after confinement for the maxi-
mum-sentence term, even a person who was fully accountable for a
crime is free to rejoin the community.90
The California Legislature has implicitly determined that the state's
interest in bringing such an individual to trial will dissipate upon reach-
ing expiration of his maximum sentence and any further commitment
will have to be justified on the same basis as other civil commitments.
Furthermore, as the Waite court recognized, even before the expiration
of the maximum-sentence period it might be necessary to release such
individuals from confinement.
The California Legislature has provided for a similar possibility. The
three-year or maximum-sentence periods were established as the outer
limitations, and provisions were made for those in which due process
86. In re Davis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 807, 505 P.2d 1018, 1025, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178, 185
(1973) (emphasis added).
87. 475 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
88. Seeid. at 393-94.
89. Id. at 395.
90. See id. at 396.
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would compel an earlier release. The California scheme has taken sepa-
rate cognizance of such situations by requiring periodic reports and by
requiring mandatory judicial review after 18 months of confinement,
both safeguards being directed toward the continued assurance that the
defendant's initial confinement is justified by the realizable goal that he
will be returned for trial.
It should be underscored here that the pretrial safeguards afforded to
all criminal defendants are now afforded to criminal defendants who are
incompetent to stand trial.91 In the past, for example, a criminal defend-
ant found incompetent at arraignment had no opportunity to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the felony charge against
him.9" As noted previously, under the new procedures one accused of a
felony may not be committed as mentally incompetent to stand trial until
he has been bound over after a preliminary or grand jury hearing estab-
lishing probable cause to believe that he committed the crime charged."
The state interest in prosecuting persons charged with crimes is
strengthened when there is a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve the defendant committed the crime, as contrasted with a more
limited interest when a mere unsupported accusation has been filed
against him. Arguably such preliminary hearings violate the de-
fendant's right to counsel because he is unable to rationally assist
counsel in the preparation of his defense. However, as recently
held in Chambers v. Municipal Court,94 the preliminary hearing
in the case of a mental incompetent serves a different function
than the preliminary hearing in other cases. In the former case,
the function of the preliminary hearing is solely to provide an evidentiary
basis for committing the defendant under the LPS Act. Thus an attack
on the preliminary hearing on the ground that the defendant was not
competent is premature until it is apparent that the defendant is going to
91. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
92. Once the defendant had been adjudged insane, all of the criminal proceedings
were suspended. CAL. PEN. CODE §1368, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1937, c. 133k at 373.
Thus the defendant could make no pretrial motions. The American Law Institute has
suggested in the Model Penal Code the adoption of the following provision: "The fact
that the defendant is unfit to proceed does not preclude any legal objection to the prose-
cution which is susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal
participation of the defendant." MODEL PENAL CODE §4.06, alternative subsection (3)
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
93. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra. An amendment to A.B. 1529 by
the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee, not contained in the final version of the bill,
provided for what might be termed a "pretrial" trial in the superior court after the de-
fendant was found to be mentally incompetent. A.B. 1529, 1973-74 Regular Session,
as amended, Jan. 23, 1974. The "pretrial" trial would have consisted of a full adversary
hearing on the merits to provide a record to justify a different classification for equal
protection purposes. If a defendant were found to be mentally incompetent at the 1368
hearing, and then "guilty" at the "pretrial" trial, it would still have been necessary to
try him again on the question of guilt or innocence when he recovered his mental compe-
tency.
94. 43 Cal. App. 3d,809, 118 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1975).
1975 / Commitment of Incompetents
be brought to trial on the information. The court noted that if and when
the defendant does become competent to stand trial the information may
be set aside because the accused was not lawfully committed by the mag-
istrate.95 Thus, a grand jury indictment or a new preliminary hearing
would be necessary in order to bring the defendant to trial.
In Davis the California Supreme Court, upon review of the constitu-
tionality of the state hospital commitment and release procedures for
incompetent criminal defendants, concluded that petitioner's commit-
ments were proper, but that some provision must be made to assure that
defendants do not face the indefinite commitment condemned in Jack-
son.9 Therefore, the initial Penal Code commitment provided in the
new statute appears to be in compliance with the Davis court's interpre-
tation of Jackson, since under the new scheme the defendant is not sus-
ceptible to an indefinite commitment. In light of these legitimate state
interests and the Davis court's expressed approval of limited commit-
ment of an incompetent defendant where the likelihood of recovery is a
factor in his release, the temporary commitment of incompetent defend-
ants under California's Penal Code commitment should withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny.
B. Long-Term Civil Commitment under the LPS Act
While the limited initial period of commitment of incompetent de-
fendants may be justified by the state interest in expeditiously bringing a
criminal defendant to trial, that interest becomes less significant as sup-
port for the indefinite commitment of defendants under the renewable
conservatorship proceedings of the LPS Act. A defendant who is subject
to these latter proceedings may be detained even though there is no sub-
stantial likelihood that he will attain competence to stand trial in the
foreseeable future. There are two directions of constitutional attack
which arguably could be taken against the LPS Act's indefinite commit-
ment standards. First, because there is but a limited class of persons
subject to indefinite commitment on this basis, an equal protection argu-
ment could be marshalled. Secondly, it could be argued that the new law
fails to meet the constitutional standards of due process because the state
95. Id. at 813, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 123. In Jackson the Supreme Court noted:
Both courts and commentators have noted the desirability of permitting some
proceedings to go forward despite the defendant's incompetency. . .. We do
not read this Court's previous decisions to preclude the States from allowing
at a minimum, an incompetent defendant to raise certain defenses such as in-
sufficiency of the indictment, or make certain pretrial motions, through coun-
sel.
406 U.S. at 740-41.
96. 8 Cal. 3d at 806, 505 P.2d at 1024, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
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has no legitimate interest in the indefinite commitment of defendants
subject to the new law or because procedural protections are inadequate.
While these two arguments are to some extent overlapping, there are
some differences. Accordingly, they will be addressed separately.
1. Equal Protection
Theon Jackson was a twenty-seven year old deaf mute with the mental
capacity of a preschool child.97 He was charged in Indiana by affidavit
with two counts of robbery,9 8 allegedly having stolen property and cash
totaling approximately nine dollars. Upon entering pleas of not guilty,
Jackson was found by the court to be incompetent to stand trial, re-
moved from the criminal process, and committed until such time as he
could be certified sane. For Jackson this was, as a practical matter, a life
commitment; there was little if any possibility that Jackson would ever
attain the level of mental competence required to stand trial.9 9 Indiana's
civil commitment statutes'00 allowed fpr indefinite commitment only
upon a showing of dangerousness to self or others, or an inability to care
for oneself, 101 neither of which could have been established from the
facts on the record in Jackson's case.
The specific equal protection holding of Jackson was that "the mere
filing of criminal charges" does not provide an adequate basis for differ-
entiation in the application of standards of commitment and release to
different classes of mental incompetents. 10 2 The equal protection hold-
ing in Jackson was an extension of the rationale of the 1966 case of
Baxstkom v. Herold.103 In that case the defendant had been convicted of
second degree assault and sentenced to a two and one-half to three year
term in the state penitentiary. In accordance with New York's statutes,
near the end of his sentence the defendant was certified by the prison
physician as insane, and was removed to a state mental institution under
the jurisdiction of the State Department of Corrections. Six months later
when his sentence expired, the defendant was again certified as insane
and formal custody shifted from the Department of Corrections to the
Department of Mental Hygiene. Nevertheless, Baxstrom remained in
97. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
98. Jackson v. State, 253 Ind. 487, 255 N.E.2d 515 (1970).
99. 406 U.S. at 717-19.
100. IND. ANN. STAT. §221201 et seq., (now IND. CODE §§ 16-14-9-1 to 16-14-9-31,
16-13-2-9 to 16-13-2-10, 35-5-3-4, 16-14-14-1 to 16-14-14-19, 16-14-15-5, 16-14-15-1, 16.
14-19-1 (1971)).
101. See 406 U.S. at 727-28.
102. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
103. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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the same institution, an institution which was used primarily for the con-
finement and care of mentally ill prisoners."0 4
Baxstrom argued, inter alia, that since his sentence had expired he
should not be denied the rights and privileges given to persons commit-
ted under the civil statutory scheme. Most importantly in this respect,
Baxstrom was not provided a jury trial on the issue of his sanity, al-
though such trial was required before a nonprisoner could be involun-
tarily committed.""5 The state argued that the different procedures for
prisoners and nonprisoners were based upon the reasonable classifica-
tion differentiating the "civilly insane" from the "criminally insane."'" 6
The court rejected the state's argument, holding that
[e]qual protection does not require that all persons -be dealt with
identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made....
For purposes of granting judicial review before a jury on the
question of whether a person is mentally ill and in need of institu-
tionalization, there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the
commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term
from all other civil commitments.' 07
In Jackson, the Court noted that the rationale of Baxstrom was fully
applicable to the standards for commitment and release of mentally ill
criminal defendants, 03 even though Baxstrom dealt with procedural
rather than substantive rules for commitment.
Without exploring the many facets of the equal protection clause, it
should be noted that the determination of whether an individual has
been denied equal protection frequently turns on the particular test
which a court applies to a given set of facts. 09 A law is not an unconstitu-
tional denial of equal protection if it operates equally on all members of a
class," and the class is properly selected. A classification is generally
valid if it is reasonable, not arbitrary, and rests upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legis-
104. Id. at 108-10.
105. See N.Y. MENTAL HYGrENE IAw §74 (McKinney 1971).
106. 383 U.S. at 111.
107. Id. at 111-12.
108. 406 U.S. at 729.
109. While the classifications generally do not have to be drawn with mathematical
precision, classifications which are underinclusive or overinclusive might not withstand
judicial scrutiny. Generally, the courts have been more willing to uphold classifications
which are underinclusive rather than overinclusive. See Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. Ray. 1065, 1082-87 (1969). However, grossly overin-
clusive classifications have been upheld by the courts under exigent circumstances, even
where the class itself, race, was suspect. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
110. Wadley v. Los Angeles County, 205 Cal. App. 2d 668, 23 Cal. Rptr. 154
(1962); Smith v. Nettleship, 195 Cal. App. 2d 393, 15 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1961); Looff
v. Long Beach, 153 Cal. App. 2d 174, 314 P.2d 518 (1957).
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lation."' The designation of the class may in itself constitute unlawful
discrimination unless there appears to be a reason why the law is not
made applicable to all generally." 2 However, the legislature is not com-
pelled to extend the application of a statute to all instances that might
conceivably fall within the ambit of the harm to be prevented.1 3 It may
deal with one aspect of a problem without including all the others that
might be affected in the same area. 14 If a valid ground for a classifica-
tion exists, it is not unconstitutional merely because it does not include
every other class that might have been included.'1" For example, a stat-
ute making a crime applicable to specific classes is valid if the classifica-
tion defines those from whom the evil is mainly to be feared.""
Neither Jackson nor Baxstrom expressly identified the precise equal
protection standard used in striking the respective statutory schemes.
However, in reaching the due process holding of Jackson, the Court did
identify the type of state interests which are generally advanced to sup-
port the involuntary indefinite commitment of an individual. These in-
terests include dangerousness to self, dangerousness to others and the
need for care, or treatment or training.11 7 As for the interest in bringing a
mentally incompetent defendant to trial, it may justify a temporary com-
mitment but for only so long as there is a substantial likelihood that the
individual will regain competence to stand trial.'18
The state's classification in Jackson was drawn solely along lines of
whether there were any pending criminal charges against the individual;
111. Cossack v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 726, 734, 523 P.2d 260, 265, 114
Cal. Rptr. 460, 465 (1974).
112. Mordecai v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Cal. 434, 438, 192 P. 40, 41 (1929);
Rauer v. Williams, 118 Cal. 401, 408, 50 P. 691, 693 (1897); In re Jentzsch, 112 Cal.
468, 474, 44 P. 803, 804 (1896); see Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604
(1891). But a statute which, on its face, applies to all generally may be a denial of
equal protection if it is designed to single out a particular social group and stigmatizes
its members. Parr v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. 3d 861, 868, 479 P.2d 353, 358, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 158 (1971).
113. Simpson v. Municipal Court, 14 Cal. App. 3d 591, 600, 92 Cal. Rptr. 417, 422
(1971); Riggins v. Riggins, 139 Cal. App. 2d 712, 718, 294 P.2d 751, 754 (1956); see,
e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
114. First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles County, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 433, 311 P.2d
508, 516 (1957), rev'd on other groundi, 357 U.S. 545 (1958); see Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
115. E.g., People v. Evans, 40 Cal. App. 3d 582, 588, 115 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308
(1974); In re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 650, 226 P. 914, 921 (1924). But see People
v. Rappard, 28 Cal. App. 3d 302, 305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 535, 536-37 (1972) (refusing to
apply the rational basis test where the class, alienage, is suspect).
116. In re Herrera, 23 Cal. 2d 206, 213, 143 P.2d 345, 348 (1943); Martin v. Su-
perior Court, 194 Cal. 93, 101, 227 P. 762, 765 (1924); In re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633,
650, 226 P. 914, 921 (1924); Guthnecht v. City of Sausalito, 43 Cal. App. 3d 269, 281,
117 Cal. Rptr. 782, 790 (1974); People v. Finston, 214 Cal. App. 2d 54, 57-58, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 165, 168 (1963).
117. 406 U.S. at 737.
118. See id. at 738.
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if so, he could be indefinitely committed under more lenient standards
than could the general population."1 9 Clearly, none of the requisite state
interests were achieved by the Indiana classification condemned in Jack-
son, since the mere pendency of any criminal charge would not necessar-
ily indicate a propensity toward dangerousness to self or others or a par-
ticularly urgent need for care. While some, and perhaps many, persons
in Jackson's class were no doubt dangerous or in severe need of help,
equal protection requires that the class itself be created to isolate such
persons. In Jackson the ratio of "class misfits" to "true class members"
was potentially too high.
Unlike the statutory scheme condemned in Jackson, the amended
LPS Act does not single out individuals for different commitment
treatment solely because criminal charges have been filed. Rather,
the parameters of the class are narrowly drawn so as to encom-
pass only those cases where there is probable cause to believe
that the defendant committed a violent felony and where the crim-
inal charges are still pending.12 0  Other than these criminal de-
fendants, the only individuals subject to indefinite commitment are
persons who are unable to feed, clothe, and house themselves.' 2'
The basic state interest to be achieved by the added classifica-
tion under the new California law is the interest in protecting society
from dangerous individuals who, but for their inability to stand trial,
would be subject to criminal prosecution. Since the California scheme,
unlike the scheme condemned in Jackson, isolates and classifies only
those individuals held to answer for violent felonies, it would seem to
represent a much more rational means of achieving this state interest.
Clearly, if the legislature had met the problem posed by Jackson by
simply amending the LPS Act to permit the indefinite commitment of
anyone who is "potentially dangerous," no constitutional question
would have been presented. 122 This is the basic scheme of most states
and was in fact offered to the legislature in the form of Senate Bill 1705
during the 1973-74 Regular Session. 2 3 Though attractive in its simplic-
ity, the proposed bill conflicted with California's orientation regarding
119. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
120. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5008(h)(2).
121. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5008(h)(1).
122. Cf. 406 U.S. 715; 8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178.
123. A more efficient solution to the Jackson problem was offered by Senate Bill
1705, as introduced by Senator Craig Biddle. If passed, this bill would have enlarged
the criteria for civil commitment under the LPS Act to permit indefinite confinement
of anyone on the ground of potential dangerousness. Although Senate Bill 1705 was
attractive for its lack of complexity, and had the support of the Attorney General, letter
from the Attorney General to the Pacific Law Journal, May 6, 1975, it is not certain
that the bill would have been approved by the legislature.
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involuntary civil commitments. The California Legislature, by rejecting
Senate Bill 1705, indicated its continued unwillingness to permit the
indefinite commitment of an individual merely because his psychiatric
profile indicates "potential dangerousness." Rather, the California Leg-
islature has required a probable cause hearing with full procedural and
evidentiary safeguards provided to the criminal defendant, showing that
the defendant has "already unhappily manifested the reality of anti-so-
cial conduct"' 2 4 and may therefore reasonably be considered more dan-
gerous than civil commitees.125
Under the new scheme it can be argued that there may be "class mis-
fits" who are indefinitely committed. That is, an individual who meets
all the requirements for indefinite commitment under the amended LPS
Act may nevertheless not be potentially dangerous. It is theoretically
possible that an individual who has committed a violent act has acted
entirely "out of character" and will not do so again, or that an individual
who is dangerous may be "cured" or may otherwise lose his propensity
for violence. On the face of the new California law, the commitment of
the incompetent defendant who has committed a violent act but is in
fact no longer dangerous continues.'
28
However, a substantially smaller portion of the class created by the
California scheme would be "class misfits" than under the Indiana clas-
sification condemned in Jackson. Again, the amended LPS Act, unlike
the Indiana classification, attempts to distinguish between criminally
charged mental incompetents who are dangerous and those who are not;
the requirement for evidence showing probable cause to believe that a
violent felony was committed is at least equivalent to a finding of poten-
tial dangerousness. 127 Thus the amended LPS Act arguably meets the
equal protection standards set down in Jackson albeit not in a manner
specifically detailed in Jackson or the cases approved by Jackson.
Moreover, several other factors tend to mitigate the problem in the
California scheme arising from the existence of "class misfits." First,
even though formally under the jurisdiction of the institution to which he
is committed, the defendant may be treated as an outpatient if the super-
intendent of the institution is of the opinion that the defendant is not a
menace to the health and safety of others, and if, after a hearing, the
124. Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
125. See Waite v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 392, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Overholser v.
O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
126. See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
127. In a significant respect the new California commitment standard provides a
greater protection to the individual than the post-Jackson, "potentially dangerous" civil
commitment standard used in most states. In California the individual must have acted.
Under the post-lackson Indiana civil commitment procedures, a mere psychiatric pro-
phecy is enough to justify what amounts to a commitment for life.
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court does not disapprove of such decision.1 28 Secondly, where there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a violent
felony, there is a substantially greater state interest in ultimately bring-
ing the defendant to trial. Just as the legislature is unwilling to deprive an
individual of his liberty solely on the basis of psychiatric opinion, the
legislature is understandably reluctant to release an individual who has
committed a violent felony solely because psychiatric opinion indicates
that there is no substantial likelihood that the individual will attain the
capacity to stand trial.129 Indeed, it would be somewhat inconsistent to
forbid confinement on the basis of psychiatric opinion alone, and yet
allow such opinion to form the sole basis for release of a criminal defend-
ant who had been held to answer for a violent felony. Thirdly, the exist-
ence of a record of evidence at a preliminary or grand jury hearing is
itself an important distinction from the Jackson situation, where the
mere filing of criminal charges formed the basis for distinguishing
among mentally incompetent individuals. It is indeed significant in this
respect that the defendant who is found incompetent to stand trial under
the California scheme may obtain suppression of illegally seized evi-
dence and may challenge the indictment or information in the same
manner as any other criminal defendant. 30
Despite these clear distinctions from the Indiana commitment proce-
dures condemned in Jackson, a court could nevertheless conclude that
the new California law fails to meet the Jackson equal protection stan-
dards simply because there is no requirement for an express finding of
"potential dangerousness" by the trial court at the time of commitment.
Such a result, however, is unlikely. A defendant committed under Penal
Code Section 1370 has been found potentially dangerous. The new stat-
ute reflects a legislative finding that probable cause to believe a person
committed a felony involving physical violence to another human being
constitutes an indication of a propensity for violence. 3' In Greenwood
v. United States, 32 a federal court upheld an indefinite commitment on
the basis of potential dangerousness even though it had to read that re-
quirement into a statute to correct a constitutional deficiency in the fed-
eral procedures. 3 The great care taken by the California Legislature to
128. CAL. PEN. CODE §§1372(b)-(c), 1374; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5369.
129. The literature provides support for the legislature's apparent reluctance to per-
mit a determination of such importance to be based almost entirely on a psychiatric judg-
ment. See, e.g., Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife
That Cuts Both Ways, in THE PsYcmhrAnc FoRum 151 (Usdin ed. 1975); Pugh, The
Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist's Views of Durham and
Brawner, 1973 WASu. U.L.Q. 87; Rosenham, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 Sci-
ENcB 250 (1973).
130. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
131. See note 129 supra.
132. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
133. Id. at 373.
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insure that a mentally incompetent criminal defendant receives every
possible protection of the law would make a similar approach by the
California courts seemingly unnecessary.
There is yet another form that an equal protection attack may take.
Specifically, it may be argued that while the California commitment
standards are constitutionally sound, after the individual has been com-
mitted for a period in excess of the maximum period of incarceration for
the crime charged, the fact that he probably committed such crime is no
longer a valid basis for treating him differently than other individuals. In
Waite v. Jacobs,'34 a similar argument was advanced by the defendant
who had been found not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon by reason
of insanity. The District of Columbia commitment scheme provided a
judicial hearing and a determination of dangerousness as a prerequisite
to the commitment of noncriminal individuals. 35 This defendant, how-
ever, had received no such hearing, and the state argued that the fact of
the insanity acquittal was a sufficient basis for treating such individuals
differently. 1 6 The court held that the acquittal would justify different
treatment but for only so long as the maximum period of incarceration
for the crime of which he was acquitted. 13 7 After the defendant had been
committed for such period, he must be placed on an equal footing with
all other individuals. 38 However, the Waite holding would appear to be
inapplicable to a defendant who is committed in California, even when
his period of commitment extends beyond the maximum period for
which he could have been penally incarcerated. In California the long-
term commitee is not committed because there is probable cause that he
committed a violent felony. Rather, the fact that there is such probable
cause is evidence of dangerousness; dangerousness is the reason he is
committed. Thus the length of commitment is unrelated to the penal
sentence for the crime charged. Unlike the scheme in Waite, the Califor-
nia scheme does not discriminate among dangerous individuals. Rather,
it merely defines the evidentiary prerequisite to the commitment of in-
competents where the incompetent has been criminally charged; in such
cases potential dangerousness is established by probable cause to believe
that a violent felony has been committed. Because potential dangerous-
ness, and not the crime charged, is the basis for the commitment, it
would seem that the amended LPS Act places all potentially dangerous
individuals, criminally charged or otherwise, on an equal footing. Thus
it would appear that the classification discussed in Waite does not exist
134. 475 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
135. Id. at 395-96.
136. Id. at 395.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 399.
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under the California scheme, and that an equal protection argument
relying on the Waite rationale would be unlikely to meet with success.
2. Due Process
Arguments may be put forth that the indefinite commitment provi-
sions of the amended LPS Act deprive a defendant of either procedural
or substantive due process. Procedurally, the California scheme mani-
fests abundant concern for the incompetent defendant. Among other
protections, counsel is required at the hearing on incompetency, 139 a
unanimous jury verdict is required on the issue of incompetence, 140 no
long-term commitment may be imposed in the absence of a preliminary
or grand jury hearing,' 41 the defendant has access to pretrial motions for
challenging the sufficiency and the legality of the evidence at the prelim-
inary hearing, 4 2 and periodic review of his commitment is required in
the form of yearly conservatorship hearings. 43 Indeed, it is unlikely that
any challenge based upon procedural due process would succeed.
In Jackson, while issues of procedural due process were alluded to,
the Indiana scheme was primarily invalidated on the basis of substantive
due process. 144 In this area there is substantial overlap with the consider-
ations presented in the equal protection discussion. If the state discrimi-
nates it must do so by classifications which are reasonably related to a
valid state interest. If there is no valid state interest in the discrimination,
then not only will the classifications fall under equal protection, but the
scheme is likely to fall under the due process clause as well. The key is-
sue in both areas is the existence vel non of a valid state interest, a
valid purpose for constructing the statutory scheme in the manner
chosen.
In Jackson the Court stated that "[a]t the least, due process requires
that the nature and duration of the commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed" when the
duration is indefinite, i.e., potentially a lifetime commitment for the in-
dividual. 145 Jackson appears to require that the purpose of such commit-
ment be the protection of society or the individual himself. 46 If the Cali-
fornia scheme meets the due process requirements of Jackson the
139. CAL. PEN. CODE §1368.
140. CAL. PEN. CODE §1369(f).
141. CAL. PEN. CODE §1368.1(a).
142. id.
143. CAL. WELF. & INsr. CODE §§5350, 5361.
144. See 406 U.S. at 731-38. Other cases also manifested a concern for the proce-
dures involved in the commitment of incompetent criminal defendants. E.g., Humphrey
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
145. 406 U.S. at 738.
146. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
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predominant state interest must be the protection of society, i.e., the
commitment of dangerous individuals.
As noted previously, the legislature has chosen to base the prerequi-
sites of indefinite commitment upon the traditional tools of judicial pro-
cedure rather than upon a psychiatric opinion that an individual may be
dangerous. 147 While a finding of probable cause that a defendant has
committed a violent felony is not the precise equivalent of a finding of
dangerousness, the former finding would appear to offer substantially
more protection than the latter.
It is unlikely that the Jackson dicta which suggests that "dangerous-
ness" must be found will be mechanically applied to invalidate the new
law. Moreover, even if dangerousness is required, the courts may find it
to be implied from either the LPS Act commitment standards or the
outpatient provisions applicable to the superintendent of the treatment
facility. In either case, periodic review at the conservatorship hearings
may be had to assure that the individuals who are confined are in fact
dangerous. Not only would the requirements of due process thereby be
met, but the libertarian policy with respect to civil commitment would be
preserved.
CONCLUSION
The new commitment scheme in California is an attempt to reconcile
two important considerations: the protection of society from dangerous
individuals who are incompetent to stand trial and therefore not subject
to penal incarceration, and the protection of individuals from indefinite
commitment based only upon a psychiatric opinion that the individual is
dangerous. Substantial procedural protections are afforded to criminal
defendants subject to commitment as incompetent to stand trial, and
continued review of their commitment is required. The initial Penal
Code commitment is fully consistent with constitutional standards. The
conservatorship commitment standards under the amended LPS Act
will no doubt be subjected to constitutional challenge, but it is likely that
the new law will be sustained. If the courts were to strike the new law as
failing to comply with the constitutional standards of Jackson, the legis-
lature would have but two alternatives: (1) to resign itself to the re-
lease of all criminal defendants who are incompetent to stand trial
but are capable of providing their own food, clothes, and hous-
ing; or (2) to change the civil commitment procedures to permit
indefinite commitment of "potentially dangerous" noncriminals. The
first alternative is unlikely to be chosen; but if it were chosen,
147. See text accompanying notes 120-21 .supra.
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the probable result would be an increased reluctance on the part
of judges, juries and even psychiatrists to conclude that a defend-
ant is incompetent to stand trial. A community might believe that
it is better served by prosecuting and sentencing a dangerously
insane individual than by allowing his insanity to immunize him
from any form of long-term commitment. 4 s It is more likely that
the legislature would choose the second alternative. If Jackson is inter-
preted to require a psychiatric evaluation of dangerousness as the sole
justification for indefinite commitment, equal protection would further
mandate equal treatment for all persons evaluated as dangerous. Such a
mandate would necessarily include noncriminals, and a showing of
probable cause that the individual has committed a violent felony would
be an unconstitutional distinction among dangerous individuals. The
ironic result would be to void a statutory scheme as violative of due
process and equal protection so that it would be replaced with a system
that is constitutional, but less concerned for the rights of the civilly in-
competent, as well as incompetent criminal defendants.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
